DISSERTATION
Defending the Peace: Causes, Consequences, and Responses to Postconflict Violence
Abstract: My dissertation centers on the threats to peace in countries emerging from armed conflict. I focus on the case of Colombia, where a landmark 2016 peace agreement with the country's largest rebel group, the FARC, has been threatened by the emergence and expansion of dissident FARC factions that reject peace. In the first chapter, I investigate the origins of conflict resurgence: why did FARC factions defect from the peace agreement and return to war? I argue that mid-level FARC commanders defected to exploit opportunities in drug trafficking and production, which perversely were made more accessible by the FARC's demobilization. I find that dissident FARC factions were up to 37 percentage points more likely to emerge in territory valuable for drug production, results that hold after using a variety of techniques to address observed and unobserved sources of confounding. In the second chapter, I explore a surprising consequence of the conflict's resurgence---a wave of attacks targeting demobilized former combatants. Why do armed groups target excombatants? I theorize that when commanders remobilize factions of an armed group, they perceive excombatants who refuse to rejoin them as potential threats. I use data tracking several hundred attacks on former FARC combatants to provide evidence for this relationship. In the third chapter, I use an experiment to investigate how conflict resurgence affects public support for peace. I theorize that partisan arguments about who is to blame can moderate or aggravate the effects of violence. I evaluate this theory in a survey experiment (N=1466) where respondents receive news about the conflict's resurgence, and in different treatment conditions receive additional information about poor government implementation or rebel group noncompliance with the peace agreement. Taken together, my findings explain how a well-designed peace agreement has struggled to bring stability to Colombia, and in the process shed light on a key set of challenges facing countries emerging from armed conflict.
WORKING PAPERS
Peace vs. Profit: Rebel Fragmentation & Conflict Resurgence in Colombia (Revise & Resubmit, International Organization)
Abstract: Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since the landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of ``middle-out fragmentation,'' whereby opportunities to profit induce mid or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that middle and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities to profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to 37 percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address several competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding---satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.
Who's to Blame? How Postconflict Violence Affects Public Support for Peace (Under Review) [PAP]
Abstract: A longstanding conventional wisdom in the peacebuilding literature holds that violence during and after a peace process undermines public support for peace. Yet the empirical record is ambiguous, and in a few high-profile cases public support for peace surged despite---or even in response to---incidents of violence. I argue that the effect of violence on attitudes towards peace may be moderated or exacerbated by political messaging about who or what is to blame. I test this argument in Colombia, a country that has seen persistent postconflict violence after a 2016 peace agreement, and where rival political camps offer competing messages that blame the government's implementation failures on one side, or noncompliance by rebel commanders on the other. I fielded a survey experiment with 1466 respondents in conflict and non-conflict zones, pairing recent news about postconflict violence with information supporting these competing political messages. I find that messaging that emphasized rebel culpability reduced respondents' support for future peace negotiations, but I do not find strong evidence that messages emphasizing poor government implementation had a countervailing effect. In a probe of the mechanisms, I find suggestive evidence that while the treatment emphasizing rebel culpability increased perceptions that rebels alone were to blame, citizens inferred from the treatment emphasizing government implementation failures that both parties were to blame, limiting the moderating effect of this message. These results suggest that political messaging during episodes of postconflict violence can influence what citizens learn from these episodes about the viability of peace processes, but that there may be an asymmetry in citizens' propensity to assign blame that advantages political opponents of peace.
PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
REVIEW ARTICLES
"When Things Fall Apart: The Impact of Global Governance on Civil Conflict" (with Leslie Johns). Journal of Politics 81 (4): E80-E84 (2019) [LINK].
Defending the Peace: Causes, Consequences, and Responses to Postconflict Violence
Abstract: My dissertation centers on the threats to peace in countries emerging from armed conflict. I focus on the case of Colombia, where a landmark 2016 peace agreement with the country's largest rebel group, the FARC, has been threatened by the emergence and expansion of dissident FARC factions that reject peace. In the first chapter, I investigate the origins of conflict resurgence: why did FARC factions defect from the peace agreement and return to war? I argue that mid-level FARC commanders defected to exploit opportunities in drug trafficking and production, which perversely were made more accessible by the FARC's demobilization. I find that dissident FARC factions were up to 37 percentage points more likely to emerge in territory valuable for drug production, results that hold after using a variety of techniques to address observed and unobserved sources of confounding. In the second chapter, I explore a surprising consequence of the conflict's resurgence---a wave of attacks targeting demobilized former combatants. Why do armed groups target excombatants? I theorize that when commanders remobilize factions of an armed group, they perceive excombatants who refuse to rejoin them as potential threats. I use data tracking several hundred attacks on former FARC combatants to provide evidence for this relationship. In the third chapter, I use an experiment to investigate how conflict resurgence affects public support for peace. I theorize that partisan arguments about who is to blame can moderate or aggravate the effects of violence. I evaluate this theory in a survey experiment (N=1466) where respondents receive news about the conflict's resurgence, and in different treatment conditions receive additional information about poor government implementation or rebel group noncompliance with the peace agreement. Taken together, my findings explain how a well-designed peace agreement has struggled to bring stability to Colombia, and in the process shed light on a key set of challenges facing countries emerging from armed conflict.
WORKING PAPERS
Peace vs. Profit: Rebel Fragmentation & Conflict Resurgence in Colombia (Revise & Resubmit, International Organization)
Abstract: Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since the landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of ``middle-out fragmentation,'' whereby opportunities to profit induce mid or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that middle and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities to profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to 37 percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address several competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding---satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.
Who's to Blame? How Postconflict Violence Affects Public Support for Peace (Under Review) [PAP]
Abstract: A longstanding conventional wisdom in the peacebuilding literature holds that violence during and after a peace process undermines public support for peace. Yet the empirical record is ambiguous, and in a few high-profile cases public support for peace surged despite---or even in response to---incidents of violence. I argue that the effect of violence on attitudes towards peace may be moderated or exacerbated by political messaging about who or what is to blame. I test this argument in Colombia, a country that has seen persistent postconflict violence after a 2016 peace agreement, and where rival political camps offer competing messages that blame the government's implementation failures on one side, or noncompliance by rebel commanders on the other. I fielded a survey experiment with 1466 respondents in conflict and non-conflict zones, pairing recent news about postconflict violence with information supporting these competing political messages. I find that messaging that emphasized rebel culpability reduced respondents' support for future peace negotiations, but I do not find strong evidence that messages emphasizing poor government implementation had a countervailing effect. In a probe of the mechanisms, I find suggestive evidence that while the treatment emphasizing rebel culpability increased perceptions that rebels alone were to blame, citizens inferred from the treatment emphasizing government implementation failures that both parties were to blame, limiting the moderating effect of this message. These results suggest that political messaging during episodes of postconflict violence can influence what citizens learn from these episodes about the viability of peace processes, but that there may be an asymmetry in citizens' propensity to assign blame that advantages political opponents of peace.
PROJECTS IN PROGRESS
- Mayors Under Fire: Electoral Effects of Criminal Violence in Ecuador
- With Us or Against Us: Insurgent Fratricide in Postconflict Colombia
- How Exposure to Gang Violence Affects Citizen Policing Preferences: Evidence from Buenaventura
REVIEW ARTICLES
"When Things Fall Apart: The Impact of Global Governance on Civil Conflict" (with Leslie Johns). Journal of Politics 81 (4): E80-E84 (2019) [LINK].