PUBLICATIONS
  • Peace Versus Profit: Rebel Fragmentation and Conflict Resurgence in Colombia. 2024. International Organization 78(4):701-730. [Draft] [Published Version] (Job Market Paper)​
    ​Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.

  • Who's to Blame? Postconflict Violence, Political Messaging, and Attitudes Towards Peace Agreements. 2025. British Journal of Political Science 55:e31. [Published Version]
    How do episodes of post-conflict violence affect public support for peace? I argue that political messaging about who or what is to blame can influence how violence affects attitudes towards peace agreements. I test this argument in Colombia, a country which has experienced violence after a 2016 peace agreement, and where rival political camps debate whether government failures or noncompliance by rebels is to blame. In an experiment with 1466 respondents in conflict and non-conflict zones, I paired news about post-conflict violence with information supporting these competing messages. I find that emphasizing rebel culpability reduced support for peace agreements, but emphasizing poor government implementation did not have a strong countervailing effect. A probe of the mechanisms suggests that while emphasizing rebel culpability increased perceptions that rebels alone were to blame, emphasizing government implementation failures led respondents to conclude that both parties were to blame, limiting the effectiveness of this message.

BOOK PROJECT
  • The Replacements: How and Why Rebel Splinter Groups Emerge After Peace Processes
    A growing number of governments and rebel groups have signed negotiated settlements designed to end civil wars, only for conflict to recur in the ensuing years. Alarmingly, even carefully-designed peace agreements that have secured the support of rebel leaders and decommissioned large numbers of weapons and combatants have, in several instances, failed to prevent renewed conflict. Why? This book explores how peace agreements can unintentionally sow the seeds for their own collapse by creating incentives for rebel splinter and successor groups to emerge. In conflicts financed by resources such as drug production or illegal mining, I argue that opportunities for profit both provide a powerful incentive for splinter or successor groups to form, and offer them the means to recruit and arm new members. And, perversely, to the extent that a peace agreement succeeds in demobilizing some rebel groups or factions, I contend that the removal of competitors increases the potential profits available to holdouts or splinter groups. To assess these arguments, the book draws on a rich array of quantitative data and comparative case studies from Colombia. The book underscores the challenge of making peace in conflicts fueled by valuable resources and suggests that foreclosing opportunities for profit must be a core focus of peace processes.

WORKING PAPERS​​​​
  • ​Either with us or against us: The threat of rebel group fragmentation to demobilized rebels. Accepted, Conflict Management and Peace Science (2026). [Accepted Manuscript]
    Programs to disarm and demobilize former combatants are standard features of peace agreements, but demobilized rebels face many challenges. I document a threat to demobilized rebels that emerges when rebel groups fragment; namely, selective violence by splinter groups. Why do splinter groups target demobilized rebels? While previous research on risks for this population has emphasized stigmatization or criminality, I argue that rebel splinter groups selectively target demobilized members of their parent group due to their skills, experience, and potential for intelligence sharing. I analyze the pattern of violence against demobilized members of the FARC, a major rebel group in Colombia. Areas where FARC splinter groups emerged saw increased rates of violence against demobilized FARC rebels, this violence disproportionately affected demobilized rebels compared to other civilians, and activity by other armed groups did not have similar effects. These findings highlight an understudied channel through which rebel fragmentation threatens peace agreements.

SELECTED PROJECTS IN PROGRESS​​​​
  • When Does Gang Violence Drive Emigration? (Presented at PSSI, 2024; APSA, 2025)
  • How do Civilians Perceive Security Crackdowns? Political Narratives and Public Attitudes in Times of Crisis
  • What to expect in a state of exception: The effects of military policing on crime in Ecuador (with Bernard Moscoso, Katiuska Borja, and Duncan Clark)
 
REVIEW ARTICLES
  • When Things Fall Apart: The Impact of Global Governance on Civil Conflict (with Leslie Johns). Journal of Politics 81 (4): E80-E84 (2019) [Published Version].